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Abstract. Donald Bruce Rubin is John L. Loeb Professor of Statis-
tics at Harvard University. He has made fundamental contributions
to statistical methods for missing data, causal inference, survey sam-
pling, Bayesian inference, computing and applications to a wide range
of disciplines, including psychology, education, policy, law, economics,
epidemiology, public health and other social and biomedical sciences.
Don was born in Washington, D.C. on Decem-
ber 22, 1943, to Harriet and Allan Rubin. One year
later, his family moved to Evanston, Illinois, where
he grew up. He developed a keen interest in physics
and mathematics in high school. In 1961, he went
to college at Princeton University, intending to ma-
jor in physics, but graduated in psychology in 1965.
He began graduate school in psychology at Harvard,
then switched to Computer Science (MS, 1966) and
eventually earned a Ph.D. in Statistics under the
direction of Bill Cochran in 1970. After graduating
from Harvard, he taught for a year in Harvard’s De-
partment of Statistics, and then in 1971 he began
working at Educational Testing Service (ETS) and
served as a visiting faculty member at Princeton’s
new Statistics Department. He held several visiting
academic appointments in the next decade at Har-
vard, UC Berkeley, University of Texas at Austin
and the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He was
a full professor at the University of Chicago in 1981–
1983, and in 1984 moved back to the Harvard Statis-
tics Department, where he remains until now, and
where he served as chair from 1985 to 1994 and from
2000 to 2004.
Fan Li is Assistant Professor, Department of Statistical
Science, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
27708-0251, USA e-mail: fli@stat.duke.edu. Fabrizia
Mealli is Professor, Department of Statistics, Computer
Science, Applications, University of Florence, Viale
Morgagni 59, Florence 50134, Italy e-mail:
mealli@disia.unifi.it.
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Don has advised or coadvised over 50 Ph.D. stu-
dents, written or edited 12 books, and published
nearly 400 articles. According to Google Scholar, by
May 2014, Rubin’s academic work has 150,000 cita-
tions, 16,000 in 2013 alone, placing him at the top
with the most cited scholars in the world.
For his many contributions, Don has been hon-
ored by election to Membership in the US National
Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and Fellow-
ship in the American Statistical Association, Insti-
tute of Mathematical Statistics, International Sta-
tistical Institute, Guggenheim Foundation, Hum-
boldt Foundation and Woodrow Wilson Society. He
has also received the Samuel S. Wilks Medal from
the American Statistical Association, the Parzen
Prize for Statistical Innovation, the Fisher Lecture-
ship and the George W. Snedecor Award of the
Committee of Presidents of Statistical Societies. He
was named Statistician of the Year by the American
Statistical Association’s Boston and Chicago Chap-
ters. In addition, he has received honorary degrees
from Bamberg University, Germany and the Univer-
sity of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Besides being a statistician, he is a music lover,
audiophile and fan of classic sports cars.
This interview was initiated on August 7, 2013,
during the Joint Statistical Meetings 2013 in Mon-
treal, in anticipation of Rubin’s 70th birthday,
and completed at various times over the following
months.
BEGINNINGS
Fan: Let’s begin with your childhood. I under-
stand you grew up in a family of lawyers, which
must have heavily influenced you intellectually. Can
you talk a little about your family?
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Don: Yes. My father was the youngest of four
brothers, all of whom were lawyers, and we used
to have stimulating arguments about all sorts of
topics. Probably the most argumentative uncle was
Sy (Seymour Rubin, senior partner at Arnold, For-
tas and Porter, diplomat, and professor of law at
American University), from D.C., who had framed
personal letters of thanks for service from all the
presidents starting with Harry Truman and going
through Jerry Ford, as well as from some contenders,
such as Adlai Stevenson, and various Supreme Court
Justices. I found this impressive but daunting. The
relevance of this is that it clearly created in me a
deep respect for the principles of our legal system,
to which I find statistics highly relevant—this has
obviously influenced my own application of statis-
tics to law, for example, concerning issues as diverse
as the death penalty, affirmative action and the to-
bacco litigation.
Fabri:We will surely get back to these issues later,
but was there anyone else who influenced your in-
terest in statistics?
Don: Probably the most influential was Mel, my
mother’s brother, a dentist (then a bachelor). He
loved to gamble small amounts, either in the bleach-
ers at Wrigley Field, betting on the outcome of
the next pitch, while watching the Cubs lose, or
at Arlington Race track, where I was taught at a
young age how to read the Racing Form and esti-
mate the “true” odds from the various displayed bet-
ting pools, while losing two dollar bets. Wednesday
and Saturday afternoons, during the warm months
when I was a preteen, were times to learn statistics—
even if at various bookie joints that were sometimes
raided. As I recall, I was a decent student of his, but
still lost small amounts.
There were two other important influences on
my statistical interests from the late 1950s and
early 1960s. First, there was an old friend of my
father’s from their government days together, a
Professor Emeritus of Economics at UC Berkeley,
George Mehren, with whom I had many entertain-
ing and educational (to me) arguments, which gener-
ated a respect for economics that continues to grow
to this day. And second, my wonderful teacher of
physics at Evanston Township High School—Robert
Anspaugh—who tried to teach me to think like a
real scientist, and how to use mathematics in the
pursuit of science.
By the time I left high school for college, I appreci-
ated some statistical thinking from gambling, some
Fig. 1. Five-year old D. B. Rubin.
scientific thinking from physics, and I had deep re-
spect for disciplines other than formal mathematics,
in particular, physics and the law. These, in hind-
sight, are exposures that were crucial to the kind
of statistics to which I gravitated in my later years.
More details of the influence of my mentors can be
found in Rubin (2014b).
COLLEGE TIME AT PRINCETON
Fan: You entered Princeton in 1961, first as a
physics major, but later changed to psychology.
Why the change and why psychology?
Don: That’s a good question. Inspired by Anspaugh,
I wanted to become a physicist. I was lined up
for a BA in three years when I entered Prince-
ton, and unknown to me before I entered, also lined
up for a crazy plan to get a Ph.D. in physics in
five years, in a program being reconditely planned
by John Wheeler, a very well-known professor of
physics there (and Richard Feynman’s Ph.D. ad-
visor years earlier). In retrospect, this was a wildly
over-ambitious agenda, at least for me. For a combi-
nation of complications, including the Vietnam War
(and its associated drafts) and Professor Wheeler’s
sabbatical at a critical time, I think no one suc-
ceeded in completing a five-year Ph.D. from entry.
In any case, there were many kids like me at Prince-
ton then, who, even though primarily interested in
math and physics, were encouraged to explore other
subjects. I did that, and one of the courses I took
was on personality theory, taught by a wonderful
professor, Silvan Tomkins, who later became a good
friend. At the end of my second year, I switched
from Physics to Psychology, where my mathemati-
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cal and scientific background seemed both rare and
appreciated—it was an immature decision (not sure
what a mature one would have been), but a fine one
for me because it introduced me to some new ways
of thinking, as well as to new fabulous academic
mentors.
Fabri: You had some computing skills which were
uncommon then, right? So you started to use com-
puters quite early.
Don: Yes. Sometime between my first and second
year at Princeton, I taught myself Fortran. As you
mentioned, those skills were not common, even at
places like Princeton then.
Fabri: Was learning Fortran just a matter of hav-
ing fun or did you actually use these skills to solve
problems?
Don: It was for solving problems. When I was in
the Psychology Department, I was helping to sup-
port myself by coding some of the early batch com-
puter packages for PSTAT, a Princeton statistical
software package, which competed with BMDP of
UCLA at the time. I also wrote various programs
for simulating human behavior.
Fan: In your senior year at Princeton, you applied
for Ph.D. programs in psychology and were accepted
by several very good places.
Don: Yes, I was accepted by Stanford, Michi-
gan and Harvard. I met some extraordinary peo-
ple during my visits to these programs. I went out
to Stanford first, and met William Estes, a quiet
but wonderful professor with strong mathematical
skills and a wry wit, who later moved to Harvard.
Michigan had a very strong mathematical psychol-
ogy program, and when I visited in the spring of
1965, I was hosted primarily by a very promising
graduating Ph.D. student, Amos Tversky, who was
doing extremely interesting work on human behav-
ior and how people handled risks. In later years, he
connected with another psychologist, Daniel Kahne-
man, and they wrote a series of extremely influential
papers in psychology and economics, which eventu-
ally led to Kahneman’s winning the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 2002; Tversky passed away in 1996
and was thus not eligible for the Nobel Prize. Kahne-
man (who recently was awarded a National Medal of
Science by President Obama) always acknowledges
that the Nobel Prize was really a joint award (to
Tversky and him). I was on a committee sometime
last year with Kahneman, and it was interesting to
find out that I had known Tversky longer than he
had.
Fan: But ultimately you chose Harvard.
Don:Well, we all make strange decisions. The rea-
son was that I had an east-coast girlfriend who had
another year in college.
GRADUATE YEARS AT HARVARD
Fabri: You first arrived at Harvard in 1965 as a
Ph.D. student in psychology, which was in the De-
partment of Social Relations then, but were soon
disappointed, and switched to computer science.
What happened?
Don: When I visited Harvard in the summer of
1965, some senior people in Social Relations ap-
peared to find my background, in subjects like math
and physics, attractive, so they promised me that I
could skip some of the basic more “mathy” require-
ments. But when I arrived there, the chair of the
department, a sociologist, told me something like,
“No, no, I looked over your transcript and found
your undergraduate education scientifically deficient
because it lacked ‘methods and statistics’ courses.
You will have to take them now or withdraw.” Be-
cause of all the math and physics that I’d had at
Princeton, I felt insulted! I had to get out of there.
Because I had independent funding from an NSF
graduate fellowship, I looked around. At the time,
the main applied math appeared being done in the
Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, which
recently became the Harvard’s “School of Engineer-
ing and Applied Sciences.” The division had several
sections; one of them was computer science (CS),
which seemed happy to have me.
Fan: But you got bored again soon. Was this be-
cause you found the problems in CS not interesting
or challenging enough?
Don: No, not really that. There were several rea-
sons. First, there was a big emphasis on automatic
language translation, because it was cold war time,
and it appeared that CS got a lot of money for com-
putational linguistics from ARPA (Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency), now known as DARPA.
The Soviet Union, from behind the iron curtain, pro-
duced a huge number of documents in Russian, but
evidently there were not enough people in the US
to translate them. A complication is that there are
sentences that you could not translate without their
context. I still remember one example: “Time flies
fast,” a three-word sentence that has three different
meanings depending on which of the three words
is the verb. If this three-word sentence cannot be
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automatically translated, how can one get an auto-
matic (i.e., by computer) translation of a complex
paragraph? Related to this was Noam Chomsky’s
work on transformational grammars, down the river
at MIT.
Second, although I found some real math courses
and the ones in CS on mathy topics, such as com-
putational complexity, which dealt with Turing ma-
chines, Godel’s theorem, etc., interesting, I found
many of the courses dull. Much of the time they were
about programming. I remember one of my projects
was to write a program to project 4-dimensional fig-
ures into 2-dimensions, and then rotate them us-
ing a DEC PDP-1. It took an enormous number of
hours. Even though my program worked perfectly,
I felt it was a gigantic waste of time. I also got a
C+ in that course because I never went to any of
the classes. Now, having dealt with many students,
I would be more sympathetic that I deserved a C+,
but not when I was a kid. At that time, I figured
there must be something better to do than rotating
4D objects and getting a C+. But marching through
rice paddies in Vietnam or departing for somewhere
in Canada didn’t seem appealing. So after picking
up a MS degree in CS in 1966, although I stayed an-
other year in CS, I was ready to try something else.
Fabri: How did statistics end up in your path?
Don: A summer job in Princeton in 1966 led to it.
I did some programming for John Tukey in Fortran,
LISP and COBOL. I also did some consulting for
a Princeton sociology professor, Robert Althauser,
basically writing programs to do matched sampling,
matching blacks and whites, to study racial dispar-
ity in dropout rates at Temple University. I had a
conversation with Althauser about how psychology
and then CS weren’t working out for me at Harvard.
Because Bob was doing some semi-technical things
in sociology, he knew of Fred Mosteller, although
not personally, and also knew that Harvard had a
decade-old Statistics Department that was founded
in 1957. He suggested that I contact Mosteller. Af-
ter getting back to Harvard, I talked to Fred, and
he suggested that I take some stat courses. So in my
third year in Harvard, I took mostly stat courses
and did OK in them. And the Stat department said
“Yes” to me. It also helped to have my own NSF
funding, which I had from the start; they kept re-
newing for some reason, showing their bad taste
probably, but it worked out well for me. Anyway, at
the end of my third year at Harvard, I had switched
to statistics, my third department in four years.
Fabri: Besides Mosteller, who else was on the
statistics faculty then? It was a quite new depart-
ment, as you said.
Don: The other senior people were Bill Cochran
and Art Dempster, who had recently been promoted
to tenure. The junior ones were Paul Holland; Jay
Goldman, a probabilist; and Shulamith Gross from
Berkeley, a student of Erich Lehmann’s.
Fabri: And you decided to work with Bill.
Don: Actually, I first talked to Fred. Fred always
had a lot of projects going; one was with John Tukey
and he proposed that I work on it. I told him that I
had this matched sampling project of my own, and
he suggested that I talk to Cochran—Cochran a few
years earlier was an advisor for the Surgeon Gen-
eral’s report on smoking and lung cancer. It was ob-
viously based on observational data, not on random-
ized experiments, and Fred said that Cochran knew
all about these issues in epidemiology and biostatis-
tics. So I went to knock on Bill’s door. He answered
with a grumpy sounding “yes,” I went in and he
said, “No, not now, later!” So I thought “Hmmm,
rough guy,” but actually he was a sweetheart, with
a great Scottish dry sense of humor and a love of
scotch and cigarettes (I understand the former, al-
though not the latter).
Fabri: Cochran did have a lasting influence on you,
right?
Don: Yes, he had a tremendous influence on me.
Once I was doing some irrelevant math on match-
ing, which I now see popping up again in the lit-
erature. I showed that to Bill, and he asked me,
“Do you think that’s important, Don?” I said, “Well,
I don’t know.” Then he said, “It is not important
to me. If you want to work on it, go find someone
else to advise you. I care about statistical problems
that matter, not about making things epsilon bet-
ter.” Another person who was very influential was
Art Dempster. Once I did some consulting for Data
Text, a collection of batch computer programs like
PSTAT or BMDP. I was designing programs to cal-
culate analyses of variance, do regressions, ordinary
least squares, matrix inversions, all when you have,
in hindsight, limited computing power. For advice
on some of those I talked to Dempster, who always
has great multivariate insights based on his deep
understanding of geometry—very Fisherian.
Fan: Your Ph.D. thesis was on matching, which is
the start of your life-long pursuit of causal inference.
How did your interest in causal inference start?
Don: When I worked with Althauser on the racial
disparity problem, I always emphasized to him that
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it was inherently descriptive, not really causal. I re-
membered enough from my physics education in
high school and Princeton that association is not
causation. So I was probably not intrigued by causal
inference per se, but rather by the confusion that the
social scientists had about it. You have to describe a
real or hypothetical experiment where you could in-
tervene, and after you intervene, you see how things
change, not in time but between intervention (i.e.,
treatment) groups. If you are not talking about in-
tervention, you can’t talk about causality. For some
reason, when I look at old philosophy, it seems to
me that they didn’t get it right, whereas in previ-
ous centuries, some experimenters got it. They bred
cows, or mated hunting falcons. If you mated excel-
lent female and male falcons, the resulting next gen-
eration of falcons would generally be better hunters
than those resulting from random mating. In the
20th century, many scientists and experimentalists
got it.
Fabri: So you were only doing descriptive com-
parisons in your Ph.D. thesis, and the notation of
potential outcomes was not there.
Don: Partly correct. At that time, the notation of
potential outcomes was in my mind, because that is
the way that Cochran initiated discussions of ran-
domized experiments in the class he taught in 1968.
Initially, it was all based on randomization, unbi-
asedness, Fisher’s test, etc. But the concepts had to
be flipped into ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion and analysis of variance tables, because nobody
could compute anything difficult back then. One of
the lessons in Bill’s class in regression and experi-
mental design was to use the abbreviated Dolittle
method to invert matrices, by hand! So you really
couldn’t do randomization tests in any generality.
The other reason I was interested in experiments
and social science was my family history. There was
always this legal question lurking: “But for this al-
leged misconduct, what would have happened?”
Fan: What was your first job after getting your
Ph.D. degree in 1970?
Don: I stayed at Harvard for one more year, as
an instructor in the Statistics Department, partly
supported by teaching, partly supported by the
Cambridge Project, which was an ARPA funded
Harvard–MIT joint effort; the idea was to bring the
computer science technologies of MIT and the social
sciences research of Harvard together to do wonder-
ful things in the social sciences. In the Statistics De-
partment, I was coteaching with Bob Rosenthal the
“Statistics for Psychologists” course that, ironically,
Fig. 2. D. B. Rubin (on left) with his puppy friend Thor
(on right), about 1967.
the Social Relations Department wanted me to take
five years earlier, thereby driving me out of their de-
partment! Bob had, and has, tremendous intuition
for experimental design and other practical issues,
and we have written many things together.
THE ETS DECADE: MISSING DATA, EM AND
CAUSAL INFERENCE
Fan: After that one year, you went for a position
at ETS in Princeton instead of a junior faculty posi-
tion in a research university. It was quite an unusual
choice, given that you could probably have found a
position in a respected university statistics depart-
ment easily.
Don: Right—many people thought I was goofy.
I did have several good offers, one was to stay at
Harvard, and another was to go to Dartmouth. But
I met Al Beaton, who was later my boss at ETS
in Princeton, at a conference in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, and he offered me a job, which I took. Al had a
doctorate in education at Harvard, and had worked
with Dempster on computational issues, such as the
6 F. LI AND F. MEALLI
“sweep operator.” He was a great guy with a deep
understanding of practical computing issues. Also,
he appreciated my research. Because I was an un-
dergrad at Princeton, it was almost like going home.
For several years, I taught one course at Princeton.
Between the jobs at ETS and Princeton, I was earn-
ing twice what the Harvard salary would have been,
which allowed me to buy a house on an acre and a
half, with a garage for rebuilding an older Mercedes
roadster, etc. A different style of life from that in
Cambridge.
Fan: You seem to have had a lot of freedom to
pursue research at the ETS. What was your respon-
sibility at ETS?
Don: The position at ETS was like an academic
position with teaching responsibilities replaced by
consulting on ETS’s social science problems, in-
cluding psychological and educational testing ones.
I found consulting much easier for me than teach-
ing, and ETS had interesting problems. Also there
were many very good people around, like Fred Lord,
who was highly respected in psychometrics. The
Princeton faculty was great, too: Geoffrey Watson
(of the Durbin–Watson statistic) was the chair; Pe-
ter Bloomfield was there as a junior faculty member
before he moved to North Carolina; and of course
Tukey was still there, even though he spent a lot of
time at Bell Labs. John was John, having a spectac-
ular but very unusual way of thinking—obviously a
genius. Stuart Hunter was in the Engineering School
then. These were fine times for me, with tremen-
dous freedom to pursue what I regarded as impor-
tant work.
Fabri: By any measure, your accomplishments in
the ETS years were astounding. In 1976, you pub-
lished the paper “Inference and Missing Data” in
Biometrika (Rubin, 1976) that lays the foundation
for modern analysis of missing data; in 1977, with
Arthur Dempster and Nan Laird, you published the
EM paper “Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete
Data via the EM Algorithm” in JRSS-B (Demp-
ster, Laird and Rubin, 1977); in 1974, 1977, 1978,
you published a series of papers that lay the foun-
dation for the Rubin Causal Model (Rubin, 1974,
1977, 1978a). What was it like for you at that time?
How come so many groundbreaking ideas exploded
in your mind at the same time?
Don: Probably the most important reason is that I
always worried about solving real problems. I didn’t
read the literature to uncover a hot topic to write
about. I always liked math, but I never regarded
much of mathematical statistics as real math—much
of it is just so tedious. Can you keep track of these
epsilons?
Fabri: There is no coincidence that all these pa-
pers share the common theme of missing data.
Don: That’s right. That theme arose when I was
a graduate student. The first paper I wrote on miss-
ing data, which is also my first sole-authored paper,
was on analysis of variance designs, a quite algo-
rithmic paper. It was always clear to me, from the
experimental design course from Cochran that you
should set up experiments as missing data problems,
with all the potential outcomes under the not-taken
treatments missing. But nobody did observational
studies that way, which seemed very odd to me. In-
deed, nobody was using potential outcomes outside
the context of randomized experiments, and even
there, most writers dropped potential outcomes in
favor of least squares when actually doing things.
Fan: What was the state of research on missing
data before you came into the scene?
Don: It was extremely ad hoc. The standard ap-
proach to missing data then was comparing the bi-
ases of filling in the means, or of regression impu-
tation under different situations, but almost always
under an implicit “missing completely at random”
assumption. The purely technical sides of these pa-
pers are solid. But I found there were always counter
examples to the propriety of the specific methods
being considered, and to explore them, one almost
needed a master’s thesis for each situation. I would
rather address the class of problems with some gen-
erality. There is a mechanism that creates missing
data, which is critical for deciding how to deal with
the missing data. That idea of formal indicators for
missing data goes way back in the contexts of exper-
imental design and survey design. I am consistently
amazed how this was not used in observational stud-
ies until I did so in the 1970s; maybe someone did,
but I’ve looked for years and haven’t found any-
thing. But probably because the missing data paper
was done in a relatively new way, I had great diffi-
culty in getting it published (more details in Rubin,
2014a).
Fan: The EM algorithm is another milestone in
modern statistics; it is also relevant in computer sci-
ence and one of the most important algorithm in
data mining. Though similar ideas had been used in
several specific contexts before, nobody had realized
the generality of EM. How did Dempster, Laird and
you discover the generality?
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Don: In those early years at ETS, I had the free-
dom to remain in close contact with the Harvard
people, Cochran, Dempster, Holland and Rosenthal,
which was very important to me. I always enjoyed
talking to Dempster, who is a very principled and
deep thinker. I was able to arrange some consulting
projects at ETS to bring him to Princeton. Once
we were talking about some missing data problem,
and we started discussing filling these values in, but
I knew it wouldn’t work in generality. I pointed
to a paper by Hartley and Hocking (1971), where
they deserted the approach of iteratively filling in
missing values, as in Hartley (1956) for the counted
data case, and went to Newton–Raphson, I think, in
the normal case. Even though aspects of EM were
known for years, and Hartley and others were sort
of nibbling around the edges of EM, apparently no-
body put it all together as a general algorithm. Art
and I realized that you have to fill in sufficient statis-
tics. I had all these examples like t distributions,
factor analysis (the ETS guys loved that), latent
class models. And Art had a great graduate stu-
dent, Nan Laird, available to work on parts of it,
and we started writing it up. The EM paper was
accepted right away by JRSS-B, even with invited
discussions.
Fan: Now let’s talk more about causal inference.
You are known for proposing the general poten-
tial outcome framework. It was Neyman who first
mentioned the notation of potential outcomes in
his Ph.D. thesis (Neyman, 1990), but the notation
seemed to have long been neglected.
Don: Yes, it was ignored outside randomized
experiments. Within randomized studies, the no-
tion became standard and used, for example, in
Kempthorne’s work, but as I mentioned earlier, ig-
nored otherwise.
Fan: Were you aware of Neyman’s work before?
Don: No. I wasn’t aware of his work defining po-
tential outcomes until 1990 when his Ph.D. thesis
was translated into English, although I attributed
much of the perspective to him because of his work
on surveys in Neyman (1934) and onward (see Ru-
bin, 1990a, followed by Rubin, 1990b).
Fabri: You actually met Neyman when you visited
Berkeley in the mid-1970s. During all those lunches,
had you ever discussed causal inference and poten-
tial outcomes with him?
Don: I did. In fact, I had an office right next to
his. Neyman came to Berkeley in the late 30s. He
was very impressive, not only as a mathematical
statistician, but also as an individual. There was
a tremendous aura about him. Shortly after arriv-
ing in Berkeley, I gave a talk on missing data and
causal inference. The next day, I went to lunch with
Neyman and I said something like, “It seems to me
that formulating causal problems in terms of miss-
ing potential outcomes is an obvious thing to do, not
just in randomized experiments, but also in observa-
tional studies.” Neyman answered to the effect that
(remarkable in hindsight because he did so without
acknowledging that he was the person who first for-
mulated potential outcomes), “No, causality is far
too speculative in nonrandomized settings.” He re-
peated something like this quote from his biography,
“. . .Without randomization an experiment has lit-
tle value irrespective of the subsequent treatment.”
(Also see my comment on this conversion in Ru-
bin, 2010.) Then he went to say politely but firmly,
“Let’s not talk about that, let’s instead talk about
astronomy.” He was very into astronomy at the time.
Fabri: You probably learned the reasons why he
was so involved in the frequentist approach.
Don: Yes. I remember we once had a conversation
about what confidence intervals really meant and
why the formal Neyman–Pearson approach seemed
irrelevant to me. He said something like, “You misin-
terpret what we have done. We were doing the math-
ematics; go back and read my 1934 paper where I
first defined a confidence interval.” He defined it as a
procedure that has the correct coverage for all prior
distributions (see page 589, Neyman, 1934). If you
think of that, you are forced to include all point mass
priors and, therefore, you are forced to do Neyman–
Pearson. He went on to say (approximately), “If you
are a real scientist with a class of problems to work
on, you don’t care about all point-mass priors, you
only care about the priors for the class of problems
you will be working on. But if you are doing the
mathematics, you can’t talk about the problems you
or anyone is working on.” I tried to make this point
in a comment (Rubin, 1995), but it didn’t seem to
resonate to others.
Fabri: In his famous 1986 JASA paper, Paul Hol-
land coined the term “Rubin Causal Model (RCM),”
referring to the potential outcome framework to
causal inference (Holland, 1986). Can you explain
why, if you think so, the term “Rubin Causal Model”
is a fair description of your contribution to this
topic?
Don: Actually Angrist, Imbens and I had a re-
joinder in our 1996 JASA paper (Angrist, Imbens
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and Rubin, 1996), where we explain why we think
it is fair. Neyman is pristinely associated with the
development of potential outcomes in randomized
experiments, no doubt about that. But in the 1974
paper (Rubin, 1974), I made the potential outcomes
approach for defining causal effects front and cen-
ter, not only in randomized experiments, but also in
observational studies, which apparently had never
been done before. As Neyman told me back in Berke-
ley, in some sense, he didn’t believe in doing statisti-
cal inference for causal effects outside of randomized
experiments.
Fan: Also there are features in the RCM, such as
the definition of the assignment mechanism, that be-
long to you.
Don: Yes, it was crucial to realize that random-
ized experiments are embedded in a larger class of
assignment mechanisms, which was not in the liter-
ature. Also, in the 1978 paper (Rubin, 1978a), I pro-
posed three integral parts to this RCM framework:
potential outcomes, assignment mechanisms, and a
(Bayesian) model for the science (the potential out-
comes and covariates). The last two parts were not
only something that Neyman never did, he possibly
wouldn’t even like the third part. In fact, I think
it is unfair to attribute something to someone who
is dead, who may not approve of the content being
attributed. If the fundamental idea is clear, such as
with Fisher’s randomization test of a sharp null hy-
pothesis, sure, attribute that idea to Fisher no mat-
ter what the test statistic, as in Brillinger, Jones
and Tukey (1978). Panos Toulis (a fine Harvard
Ph.D. student) helped me track down this statement
that I remembered reading in my ETS days from a
manuscript John gave to me:
“In the precomputer era, the fact that almost all
work could be done once and for all was of great im-
portance. As a consequence, the advantages of ran-
domization approaches—except for those few cases
where the randomization distributions could be dealt
with once and for all—were not adequately valued.
One reason for this undervaluation lay in the
fact that, so long as randomization was confined
to specially manageable key statistics, there seemed
no way to introduce into the randomization ap-
proach the insights—some misleading and some im-
portant and valuable—into what test statistics would
be highly sensitive to the changes that it was most
desired to detect. The disappearance of this situa-
tion with the rise of the computer seems not to have
received the attention that it deserves.” (Brillinger,
Jones and Tukey, 1978, Chapter 25, page F-5.)
Fabri: Here I am quoting an interesting question
by Tom Belin regarding potential outcomes: “Do
you believe potential outcomes exist in people as
fixed quantities, or is the notion that potential out-
comes are a device to facilitate causal inference?”
Don: Definitely the latter. Among other things,
a person’s potential outcomes could change over
time, and how do we know the people who were
studied in the past are still exchangeable with peo-
ple today? But there are lots of devices like that in
science.
Fan: In the RCM, cause/intervention should al-
ways be defined before you start the analysis. In
other words, the RCM is a framework to investi-
gate the “effects of a cause,” but not the “causes of
an effect.” Some criticize this as a major limitation.
Do you regard this as a limitation? Do you think
it is ever possible to draw inference on the causes
of effects from data, or is it, per se, an interesting
question worth further investigation?
Don: I regard “the cause” of an event topic as
more of a cocktail conversation topic than a scien-
tific inquiry, because it leads to an essentially infinite
regress. Someone says, “He died of lung cancer be-
cause he smoked three packs a day”; then someone
else counters, “Oh no, he died of lung cancer be-
cause both of his parents smoked three packs a day
and, therefore, there was no hope of his doing any-
thing other than smoking three packs a day”; then
another one says, “No, no, his parents smoked be-
cause his grandparents smoked—they lived in North
Carolina where, back then, everyone smoked three
packs a day, so the cause is where the grandparents
lived,” and so on. How far back should you go? You
can’t talk sensibly about the cause of an event; you
can talk about “but for that cause (and there can
be many ‘but for’s), what would have happened?”
All these questions can be addressed hypothetically.
But the cause? The notion is meaningless to me.
Fabri: Do you feel that you benefit from knowing
about history of statistics when you are thinking
about fundamentals of statistics?
Don: I know some history, but not a large amount.
The most important lessons occur when I feel that
I understand why one of the giants, like Fisher or
Neyman, got something wrong. When you under-
stand why a mediocre thinker got something wrong,
you learn little, but when you understand why a ge-
nius got something wrong, you learn a tremendous
amount.
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Fig. 3. D. B. Rubin (on left) poses with the captain (on
right) of Sy’s boat harbored in Bodrum, Turkey, mid-1970s.
BACK TO HARVARD: PROPENSITY SCORE,
MULTIPLE IMPUTATION AND MORE
Fabri: After those productive years at ETS, you
spent some time at the EPA (US Environmental
Protection Agency). Why did you decide to move,
given that you were apparently doing very well at
the ETS?
Don: It started partly from my joking answer to
the question, “How long have you been at ETS?”
I answered, “Too long.” The problems that I had
dealt with at ETS started to appear repetitive, and
I felt that I had made important contributions to
them including EM and multiple imputation ideas,
which were being used to address some serious is-
sues, like test equating, and formulating the right
ways to collect data. So I wanted to try something
else. At the time, David Rosenbaum was the head
of the Office of Radiation Programs at the EPA. He
had the grand idea of putting together a team of
applied mathematicians and statisticians. Somehow
he found my name and invited me to D.C. to find
out whether I wanted to lead such a group. Basi-
cally, I had the freedom to hire several people of
my choice, and I had a good government salary (at
the level of “Senior Executive Service”). So I said,
“Let’s see whom I can get.” I was able to convince
both Rod Little (who was in England at that time)
and Paul Rosenbaum (whom I advised while I was
still at ETS), as well as Susan Hinkins, who wrote
a thesis on missing data at Montana State Univer-
sity, and two others. That was shortly before the
presidential election. Then the Democrats lost and
Reagan was to come in, and everything seemed to
be falling apart. All of a sudden, many of the peo-
ple above my level at the EPA (most of whom were
presidential appointments), had to prepare to turn
in their resignations, and had to be concerned about
their next positions.
Fabri: So the EPA project ended before it even
got started.
Don: It didn’t start at all in some sense. I formally
signed on at the beginning of December, and after
one pay period, I turned in my resignation. But I
felt responsible to find jobs for all these people I
brought there. Eventually, Susan Hinkins got con-
nected with Fritz Scheuren at the IRS; Paul Rosen-
baum got a position at the University of Wisconsin
at Madison; Rod got a job related to the Census.
One nice thing about that short period of time is
that, through the projects I was in charge of, I made
several good connections, such as to Herman Cher-
noff and George Box. George and I really hit it off,
primarily because of his insistence on statistics hav-
ing connections to real problems, but also because
of his wonderful sense of humor, which was witty
and ribald, and his love of good spirits. In any case,
the EPA position led to an invitation to visit Box at
the Math Research Center at the University of Wis-
consin, which I gladly accepted. That gave me the
chance to finish writing the propensity score papers
with Paul (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a, 1983b,
1984a).
Fan: Since you mentioned propensity score, ar-
guably the most popular causal inference technique
in a wide range of applied disciplines, can you give
some insights on the “natural history” of propensity
score?
Don: I first met Paul in 1978, when I came to Har-
vard on a Guggenheim fellowship; he was a first-year
Ph.D. student, extremely bright and devoted. Back
in my Princeton days I did some consulting for a
psychologist at Rutgers, June Reinisch, who later
became the first director of the Kinsey Institute af-
ter Kinsey. She was very interested in studying the
nature-nurture controversy—what makes men and
women so different? She and her husband, who was
also a psychologist, were doing experiments on rats
and pigs. They injected hormones into the uteri of
pregnant animals, and thereby exposed the fetuses
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to different prebirth environments; this kind of ran-
domized experiment is obviously unethical to do
with humans. One of the problems Paul and I were
working on for this project, also as part of Paul’s
thesis, was matching—matching background char-
acteristics of exposed and unexposed. The covari-
ates included a lot of continuous and discrete vari-
ables, some of which were rare events like certain
serious diseases prior to, or during, early pregnancy.
Soon it became clear that standard matching ap-
proaches, like Mahalanobis matching, do not work
well in such high dimensional settings. You have to
find some type of summaries of these variables and
balance the summaries in the treatment and control
groups, not individual to individual. Then we real-
ized if you have an assignment mechanism, you can
match on the individual assignment probabilities,
which is essentially the Horvitz–Thompson idea, to
eliminate all systematic bias. I don’t remember the
exact details, but I think we first got the propen-
sity score idea when working on a Duke data bank
on coronary artery bypass surgery, but refined it for
the Reinisch data, which is very similar in principle.
Again, the idea of the propensity score is motivated
by addressing real problems, but with generality.
Fan: Multiple Imputation (MI) is another very in-
fluential contribution of yours. Your book “Multi-
ple Imputation for Nonresponse in Sample Surveys”
(Rubin, 1987a) has commonly been cited as the ori-
gin of MI. But my understanding is that you first
developed the idea and coined the term much ear-
lier.
Don: Correct, I first wrote about MI in an ASA
proceedings paper in 1978 (Rubin, 1972, 1978b).
That’s where “the 18+ years” comes from when I
wrote “Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years” (Ru-
bin, 1996).
Fabri: MI has been developed in the context of
missing data, but it applicability seems to be far
beyond missing data.
Don: Yes, MI has been applied and will be, I think,
all over the place. The reason I titled the book that
way, “Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Sam-
ple Surveys,” is that it was obvious to me that in
the settings where you need to create public-use
data sets, you had to have a separation between
the person who fixed up the missing data problem
and the many people who might do analyses of the
data. So there was an obvious need to do some-
thing like this, because users could not possibly have
the collection of tools and resources to do the im-
putation, for example, using confidential informa-
tion. My Ph.D. students, Trivellore Raghunathan
(Raghu) and Jerry Reiter, have made wonderful con-
tributions to confidentiality using MI. Of course,
other great Ph.D. students of mine Nat Schenker,
Kim Hung Lee, Xiao-Li Meng, Joe Schafer, as well
as many others, have also made major contributions
to MI. The development of MI really reflects the col-
lective efforts from these people and others like Rod
Little and his colleagues and students.
Fabri: Rod Little once half-jokingly said, “Want
to be highly cited? Coauthor a book with Rubin!”
And indeed he wrote the book “Statistical Analy-
sis with Missing Data” with you (Little and Rubin,
1987, 2002), which is now regarded as the classic
textbook on missing data. There have been a lot
of new advances and changes in missing data since
then. Will we see a new edition of the book that
incorporates these developments sometime soon?
Don: Oh yes, we are working on that now. The
main changes from 1987 to 2002 reflect the greater
acceptability of Bayesian methods and MCMC type
computations. Rod is a fabulous coauthor, a much
more fluid writer than I am. I believe this third edi-
tion will have even more major changes than the
2002 one did from the 1987 one, but again many
driven by computational advances.
ON BAYESIAN
Fan: In the 1978 Annals paper (Rubin, 1978a),
you gave, for the first time, a rigorous formula-
tion of Bayesian inference for causal effects. But the
Bayesian approach to causal inference did not have
much following until very recently, and the field of
causal inference is still largely frequentist. How do
you view the role of Bayesian approach in causal
inference?
Don: I believe being Bayesian is the right way to
approach things, because the basic frequentist ap-
proach, such as the Fisherian tests and Neyman’s
unbiased estimates and confidence intervals, usually
does not work in complicated problems with many
nuisance unknowns. So you have to go Bayesian to
create procedures. You can go partially Bayesian us-
ing things like posterior predictive checks, where
you put down a null that you may discover evi-
dence against, or direct likelihood approaches as in
Frumento et al. (2012); if the data are consistent
with a null that is interesting, you live with it. But
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Fig. 4. D. B. Rubin at Harvard, early 1980s.
Neyman-style frequentist evaluations of Bayesian
procedures are still relevant.
Fan: But why is the field of causal inference still
predominantly frequentist?
Don: I think there are several reasons. First, there
are many Bayesian statisticians who are far more in-
terested in MCMC algebra and algorithms, and do
not get into the science. Second, I regard the method
of moments (MOM) frequentist approach as peda-
gogically easier for motivating and revealing sources
of information. Take the simple instrumental vari-
able setting with one-sided noncompliance. Here, it
is very easy to look at the simple MOM estimate to
see where information comes from. With Bayesian
methods, the answer is, in some sense, just there in
front of you. But when you ask where the informa-
tion comes from, you have to start with any value,
and iterate using conditional expectations, or draws
from the current joint distributions. You have to
have far more sophisticated mathematical thinking
to understand fully Bayesian ideas. There are these
problems with missing data (as in my discussion
of Efron, 1994) where there are unique, consistent
estimates of some parameters using MOM, but for
which the joint MLE is on the boundary. So I think
it is often easier, pedagogically, to motivate simple
estimators and simple procedures, and not try to be
efficient when you convey ideas. In causal inference,
that corresponds to talking about unbiased or nearly
unbiased estimates of causal estimands, as in Rubin
(1977). There are other reasons having to do with
the current education of most statisticians.
Fan: After EM, starting from the early 1980s,
you were heavily involved in developing methods
for Bayesian computing, including the Bayesian
bootstrap (Rubin, 1981), the sampling importance-
resampling (SIR) algorithm (Rubin, 1987b), and
(lesser-acknowledged) “approximate Bayesian com-
putation (ABC)” (Rubin, 1984, Section 3.1).
Don: It was clear then that computers were going
to allow Bayes to work far more broadly than earlier.
You, as well as others such as Simon Tavare, Chris-
tian Robert and Jean-Michel Marin, are giving me
credit for first proposing ABC. Thanks! Although,
frankly, I never thought that would be a useful al-
gorithm except in problems with simple sufficient
statistics.
Fabri: But you do not seem to have followed up
much on these ideas later, even if you have used
them. Also you do not label yourself as a Bayesian
or a frequentist, even if all these papers made ex-
traordinary contributions to Bayesian inference with
fundamental and big ideas.
Don: First of all, fundamentally I am hostile to
all “religions.” I recently heard a talk by Raghu in
Bamberg, Germany, where he said that in his world
they have zillions of gods, and I think that is right;
you should have zillions of gods, one for this good
idea, one for that good idea. And different people
can create different gods to whatever extent they
want to. I am not a fully-pledged member of the
Bayesian camp—I like being friends with them, but
I never want to be religiously Bayesian. My attitude
is that any complication that creates problems for
one form of inference creates problems for all forms
of inference, just in different ways. For example, the
fact that confounded treatment assignments cause
problems for frequentist inference is obvious. Does
it generate problems for the Bayesian? Yeah, that
point was made in the 1978 Annals paper: Random-
ization matters to a Bayesian, although not in the
same way as to a frequentist, that is, not as the basis
for inference, but it affects the likelihood function.
There is something I am currently working on with
a Ph.D. student, Viviana Garcia, that builds on a
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paper I wrote with Paul Rosenbaum in 1984 (Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1984b), which is the only Bayesian
paper that Paul has ever written, at least with me.
In that paper, we did some simulations to show there
is an effect on Bayesian inference of the stopping
rule. We show that if you have a stopping rule and
use the “wrong” prior to do the analysis, like a uni-
form improper prior, but the data are coming from a
“correct” prior, and you look at the answer you get
from the right prior and from the “wrong” prior,
they are different. The portion of the right poste-
rior that you cover using the “wrong” posterior is
incorrect. This extends to all situations and it is re-
lated to all of these ignorability theorems, and it
means that you need to have the right model with
respect to the right measure. Of course achieving
this is impossible in practice and, therefore, leads to
the need for frequentist (Neymanian) evaluations of
the operating characteristics of Bayesian procedures
when using incorrect models (Rubin, 1984). Bayes
works, in principle, there is no doubt, but it can be
so hard! It can work, in practice, but you must have
some other principles floating around somewhere to
evaluate the consequences—how wrong your conclu-
sions can be. So you must have something to fall
back on, and I think that is where these frequentist
evaluations are extremely useful, not the uncondi-
tional Neyman–Pearson frequentist evaluations for
all point mass priors (which were critical as mathe-
matical demonstrations that we cannot achieve the
ideal goal in any generality), but evaluations for the
class of problems that you are dealing with in your
situation.
Fan: The 1984 Annals paper “Bayesianly Justi-
fiable and Relevant Frequency Calculations for the
Applied Statistician” (Rubin, 1984) is one of my all-
time favorite papers. This paper, as the earlier paper
by George Box (Box, 1980), deals with the “cali-
brated Bayes” paradigm with generality, which can
be viewed as a compromising or mid-ground between
the Bayesian and frequentist paradigms. It has a
profound influence on many of us. In particular, Rod
Little has strongly advocated “calibrated Bayes” as
the 21st century roadmap of statistics in several of
his prominent talks, including the 2005 ASA Presi-
dent’s Invited Address and the 2012 Fisher Lecture.
What was the background and reasons for you to
write that paper?
Don: Interesting question. I was visiting Box at
the Mathematics Research Center in 1981–1982 and
wrote Rubin (1983) partly during that period—
I think it’s a good paper with some good ideas, but
without a satisfying big picture. That dissatisfaction
led to that 1984 paper—what is the big picture? It
took me a very long time to “get it right,” but it
all seems very obvious to me now. The idea of pos-
terior predictive checks has been further articulated
and advanced in Meng (1994), Gelman, Meng and
Stern (1996), and the multiauthored book “Bayesian
Data Analysis” (Gelman et al., 1995, 2003, 2014).
Fabri: Can you talk a little more about the
“Bayesian Data Analysis” book, probably one of the
most popular Bayesian textbooks?
Don: Yup, I think that the Gelman et al. book
might be THE most popular Bayesian text. It
started out as notes by John Carlin for a Bayesian
course that he taught when I was Chair sometime
in the mid or late 1980s. Andy must have been a
Ph.D. student at that time, with tremendous en-
ergy for scholarship. John was heading back to Aus-
tralia, which is his homeland, and somehow the de-
partment had some extra teaching money, and we
wanted to keep John around for a year—I do not
remember the details. But I do remember that the
idea of turning the notes for the course into a full
text was percolating. Also Hal Stern was an Asso-
ciate Professor with us at that time, and so the four
of us decided to make it happen. We basically di-
vided up chapters and started writing. Even though
John’s initial notes were the starting basis, things
changed as soon as Andy “took charge.” Quickly,
Andy and Hal were the most active. Andy, with
Hal, were even more dominant in the second edition,
where I added some parts, edited others, but clearly
this was Andy’s show. The third edition, which just
came out in early 2014, was even more extreme, with
Andy adding two coauthors (David Dunson and Aki
Vehtari) because he liked their work, and they had
been responsive to Andy’s requests. As the old man
of the group, I just requested that I be the last au-
thor; Andy obviously was the first author, and the
second and third were as in the first edition. In some
ways, I feel like I’m an associate editor of a journal
that has Andy as the editor! We get along fine, and
clearly it’s a successful book.
Fan: A revolutionary development in statistics
since the early 90s was the MCMC methodology.
You left your mark in this with Gelman, proposing
the Gelman–Rubin statistic for convergence check
(Gelman and Rubin, 1992), which seems to be very
much connected to some of your previous work.
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Don: Correct. We embedded the convergence
check problem into the combination of the multiple
imputation and multiple chains frameworks, using
the idea of the combining rules for MI. The idea of
using multiple chains—that comes from physics—
and was Andy’s knowledge, not mine. My contri-
bution was to suggest using modified MI combining
rules to help do the assessment of convergence. The
idea is powerful because it is so simple. If the start-
ing value does not matter, which is the whole point,
then it doesn’t matter, period. The real issue should
be how you choose the functions of the estimands
that you are assessing, and as always, you want con-
vergence to asymptotic normality to be good for
these functions, so that the simple justification for
the Gelman–Rubin statistic is roughly accurate.
THE 1990S: COLLABORATING WITH
ECONOMISTS
Fabri: In the 1990s, you started to work with
economists. With Joshua Angrist, and particularly
with Guido Imbens, you wrote a series of very in-
fluential papers, connecting the potential outcomes
framework to causal inference with instrumental
variables. Can you tell us how this collaboration
started?
Don: Absolutely. I always liked economics; many
economists are great characters! It was in the early
90s when Guido came to my office as a junior fac-
ulty member in the Harvard Economics Department
and basically said, “I think I have something that
may interest you.” I had never met him before, and
he was asking if the concept of instrumental vari-
ables already had a history in statistics. Guido and
Josh Angrist had already defined the LATE (local
average treatment effect) in an Econometrica pa-
per (Imbens and Angrist, 1994)—although I think
CACE (Complier Average Causal Effect) is a much
better name because it is more descriptive and more
precise—local can be local for anything, local for
Boston, local for females, etc. Then I asked in re-
turn, “Well tell me the setup, I have never heard of
it in statistics before” and while he was explaining I
started thinking, “Gosh, there is something impor-
tant here! I have never seen it before,” and then I
said, “Let’s meet tomorrow and talk about it more,”
because these kinds of assumptions (monotonicity
and the “exclusion restriction”) were fascinating to
me, and it was clear that there was something there
that I had never really thought hard about; it was
great. That eventually led to the instrument vari-
ables paper (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996) and
the later Bayesian paper (Imbens and Rubin, 1997).
A closely related development was a project I
was consulting on for AMGEN at about the same
time, for a product for the treatment of ALS (amy-
otrophic lateral sclerosis), or Lou Gehrig’s disease,
which is a progressive neuromuscular disease that
eventually destroys motor neurons, and death fol-
lows. The new product was to be compared to the
control treatment where the primary outcome was
quality of life (QOL) two years post-randomization,
as measured by “forced vital capacity” (FVC), es-
sentially, how big a balloon you can blow up. In
fact, many people do not reach the end-point of two-
year post-randomization survival, and so two-year
QOL is “truncated” or “censored” by death. Peo-
ple were trying to fit this problem into a “missing
data” framework, but I realized right away that it
was something different.
Fan: Essentially both ideas are special cases of the
general idea of Principal Stratification, which we can
discuss in a moment.
Don: Yes, indeed. These meetings with Guido and
this way of thinking were so much more articulated
and close to the thinking of European economists in
the 30s and 40s, like Tinbergen and Haavelmo, than
many subsequent economists who seemed sometimes
to be too into their OLS algebra in some sense.
There was some correspondence between one of the
two—Haavelmo, I think—and Neyman on these hy-
pothetical experiments on supply and demand. Eu-
ropean brains were talking to each other, and not
simply exchanging technical mathematics!
Fabri: I know that many years before you met
Guido, with other statisticians, like Tukey, you had
discussions about the way economists were treating
selection problems, or missing data problems. But
you had some adventurous, to say the least, previ-
ous experiences with economists dealing with prob-
lems that you had worked on, which they had almost
neglected completely.
Don: Yes, James Heckman was tracking my work
in the early 1980s when I came to Chicago after
ETS. The public exchange came out in the ETS
volume edited by Howard Wainer (which is where
Glynn, Laird and Rubin, 1986, appears), with com-
ments from Heckman, Tukey, Hartigan and others.
Fabri: Economics is a field where the idea of
causality is crucial; did you find interest in eco-
nomics also for this very reason? The problems they
have are usually very interesting.
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Fig. 5. In classroom at Harvard, late 1980s.
Don: There are often interesting questions from
social science students that come up in class. One
recent example is how do we answer questions like
“What would the Americas be like if they were
not settled by Europeans?” I asked the questioner,
“Who would they be settled by instead? By the Chi-
nese? By the Africans? What are you talking about?
What are we comparing the current American world
to?” Another example comes from an undergradu-
ate thesis that I directed, by Alice Xiang, which won
both the Hoopes Prize and the economics’ Harris
Prize for an outstanding honors thesis. The thesis
is on the causal effect of racial affirmative action
in law school admissions on some outcomes versus
the same proportion of affirmative action admissions
but counter-factually based on socioeconomic sta-
tus. This is not just for cocktail conversation—it was
a case recently before the US Supreme Court, Fisher
v. University of Texas, which was kicked back to the
lower court to reconsider, and additionally the issue
was recently affected by a state law in Michigan.
There is an amicus brief sent to the US Supreme
Court to which Guido (Imbens), former Ph.D. stu-
Fig. 6. (Left to right) Guido Imbens, Don Rubin, Josh Angrist. March, 2014.
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dents, Dan Ho, Jim Greiner and I (with others) con-
tributed.
Such careful formulation of questions is something
critical, and to me is central to the field of statis-
tics. It is crucial to formulate clearly your causal
question. What is the alternative intervention you
are considering, when you talk about the causal ef-
fect of affirmative action on graduation rates or bar-
passage rates? Immediately formulating the problem
as an OLS regression is the wrong way to do this,
at least to me.
Fan: You apparently have a long interest in law;
besides the aforementioned “affirmative action” the-
sis, you have done some interesting work in applied
statistics in law.
Don: Yes. Paul Rosenbaum was, I think, the first
of my Harvard students who did something about
statistics in law. Either his qualifying paper or a
class paper in 1978 was on the effect of the death
penalty. Jim Greiner, another great Ph.D. student
of mine, who had a law degree before entering Har-
vard Statistics, wrote his Ph.D. thesis (and subse-
quently several important papers) on potential out-
comes and causal effects of immutable characteris-
tics. He is now a full professor at the Harvard Law
School. There were also several previous undergrad-
uate students of mine who were interested in statis-
tics and law, but (sadly) most went to law school.
Since 1980, I have been involved in many legal top-
ics.
THE NEW MILLENNIUM: PRINCIPAL
STRATIFICATION
Fabri: The work you did with Guido, as well as
the work on censoring due to death, led to your pa-
per on Principal Stratification (Frangakis and Ru-
bin, 2002), coauthored with this brilliant student of
yours, Constantine Frangakis, who happens to be
Fan’s advisor.
Don: Yes, Constantine is fabulous, but the origi-
nal title of that paper was very long, same with the
title of his thesis. It went on and on, with proba-
bly a few Latin, a few Italian, a few French and a
few Greek words! Of course I was exasperated, so I
convinced him to simplify the paper’s title to “Prin-
cipal Stratification in Causal Inference.” He is bril-
liant, so good that he has no trouble dealing with
all the complexity in his own mind, but therefore he
struggles at times pulling out the kernels of all these
ideas, making them simple.
Fan: What do you think is the most remarkable
thing about the development of Principal Stratifica-
tion?
Don: It is a whole new collection of ways of think-
ing about what the real information is in causal
problems. Once you understand what the real in-
formation is, you can start thinking about how you
can get the answers to questions that you want
to extract from that information; you always have
to make assumptions, and it forces you to expli-
cate what these assumptions are, not in terms of
OLS, which no social scientist or doctor would re-
ally understand—but in terms of scientific or medi-
cal entities. And because you have to make assump-
tions, be honest and state them clearly. For exam-
ple, I like your papers (Mealli and Pacini, 2013;
Mattei, Li and Mealli, 2013) about multiple post-
randomization outcomes, where you discuss that for
some outcomes, exclusion restriction or other struc-
tural assumptions may be more plausible.
Fabri: Principal Stratification is sometimes com-
pared to other tools for doing so-called mediation
analysis—what is your view about inferring on me-
diation effects?
Don: I think we (Don and Fabri) discussed a paper
recently in JRSS-A, and those discussions summa-
rize my–our view on that. Essentially, some of the
people writing about mediation seem to misunder-
stand what a function is. They write down some-
thing that has two arguments inside parenthesis,
with a comma separating them, and they seem to
think that therefore something is well defined!
Fan: Even though causal inference has gained in-
creasing attention in statistics and beyond, there
seems to be a lot of misunderstanding, misuse, mis-
interpretation and mystifying of causal inference.
Why? And what needs to be done to change?
Don: I think it is partly because causal inference is
a very different topic from many topics in statistics
in that it does not demand a lot of technical ad-
vanced mathematical knowledge, but does demand
a lot of conceptual and basic mathematical sophisti-
cation. Principal Stratification is one such example.
Writing down notation does not take the place of
understanding what the notation means and how
to prove things mathematically. Also partly because
causal inference has become a popular topic, it has
been flooded with publications that are often done
casually. For some fields, it is important to bridge
the “old” (everything-based-on-OLS) thinking with
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the newer ideas. That’s a battle Guido and I con-
stantly had to deal with when writing our book (Im-
bens and Rubin, 2015).
Fan: You mentioned the book; when will it finally
come out? It has been forthcoming for the last ten
years or so.
Don: (Laughing) Come on, Fan, that’s not fair!
Has it only been ten years? We have promised the
publisher (Cambridge University Press) that it will
be ready by September 30, 2013.1 It will be about
500 pages, 25 chapters. It will be followed by another
volume, dealing with topics that we could not get to
in the volume due to length, such as principal strat-
ification beyond IV settings, or because we believe
the topics have not been sharply and cleanly formu-
lated yet, such as regression discontinuity designs,
or using propensity scores with multiple treatments.
Also in this volume, we didn’t discuss so-called case–
control studies, which are the meat of much of epi-
demiology; it is very important to embed these stud-
ies into a framework that makes sense, not just teach
them as a bag of tricks.
MENTORING, CONSULTING AND
EDITORSHIP
Fabri: You have advised over 50 Ph.D. students
and many BA students as well. This sounds like a
job interview, but what is your teaching philosophy?
Don: My view is that one should approach teach-
ing very differently depending on the kind of stu-
dents you have and their goals. Harvard has tremen-
dous undergraduate and graduate students, but
their strengths vary and their objectives vary. A long
time ago I decided that I don’t have the desire or
ability to be an entertainer in class, that is, to en-
tertain to get their attention. If they find me enter-
taining, fine; but it is better if they find the topic I
am presenting entertaining.
Fabri: Many of your students went on to become
leaders and not only in academia. And you often
say that the thing that you are the most proud of is
your students. Though it is clearly impossible to talk
about them here one by one, can you share some of
your fond memories of the students?
Don: Fabri, that is a killer question unless we have
another day for this. What I can say is that it has
been a great pleasure to supervise so many very tal-
ented students. I could start listing my superb Ph.D.
students at the University of Chicago and at Har-
1As of April 1, 2014, the book can be preordered on
Amazon.com.
vard. All of my Ph.D. students are talented in many,
and sometimes different, dimensions: among them
there are two COPSS award winners, one president
of the ASA, one president of ENAR, two JSM pro-
gram chairs, and other such honors, and many of
them made substantial contributions to government,
academia and industry.
Fan: You also have advised a large number of un-
dergraduate students on a wide range of topics. This
is quite uncommon because some people find men-
toring undergraduates more challenging and less re-
warding than mentoring graduate students. What is
your take on this?
Don: I am not completely innocent on this charge.
I have no interest in “babysitting” and trying to
motivate unmotivated students, either undergrad-
uate or graduate. But Harvard does attract some
extremely talented and motivated undergraduates,
some of whom I had the pleasure to advise. Five
have won Hoopes and other prizes for outstanding
undergraduate theses.
Fabri: Now let’s talk about writing, which both
Fan and I, as many others, have some quite mem-
orable first-hand experience. You are known as a
perfectionist in writing. As you mentioned, you are
willing to withdraw accepted papers if you are not
a hundred percent satisfied with them.
Don: Yes, as you guys know, I am generally a pain
in the neck as a coauthor. I have withdrawn three ac-
cepted papers, and tried to improve them; all even-
tually got reaccepted. One of these is the paper with
you guys and others on multiple imputation for the
CDC Anthrax vaccine trial (Li et al., 2014). You
were not too happy about it initially.
Fabri: (Laughing) Yeah, we tried to revolt with-
out success. A different question: How do you ap-
proach rejections? Do you have some advice for
young statisticians on that?
Don: Over the years I had many papers immedi-
ately rejected or rejected with the suggestion that it
would not be wise to resubmit. However, in almost
all of these cases, this treatment led to markedly
improved publications, somewhere. In fact, I think
that the drafts that have been repeatedly rejected
possibly represent my best contributions. Certainly,
the repeated rejections, combined with my trying
to address various comments, led to better exposi-
tion and sometimes better problem formulation, too.
The most important idea is: Do not think that peo-
ple who are critics are hostile. In the vast majority
of cases, editors and reviewers are giving up their
time to try to help authors, and, I believe, are often
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Fig. 7. D. B. Rubin (on left) with Tom Belin (on right) and Tom’s daughter Janet (middle), Cambridge, 2008.
especially generous and helpful to younger or inex-
perienced authors. Do not read into rejection letters
personal attacks, which are extremely rare. So my
advice is: Quality trumps quantity, and stick with
good ideas even when you have to do polite bat-
tle with editors and reviewers—they are not perfect
judges, but they are, almost uniformly, on your side.
More details of these are given in Rubin (2014b).
Fan: In 1978, you became the Coordinating and
Applications Editor of JASA. Is there anything par-
ticularly unique about your editorship?
Don:As author, I am willing to withdraw accepted
papers. As a new editor, at least then, I was also will-
ing to suggest to authors that they withdraw papers
accepted by the previous editors! I took some heat
for that at the beginning. I read through all the pa-
pers that the previous editorial board had accepted
and were awaiting copyediting for publication; for
the ones that I thought were bad (I remember there
were about eight), I wrote, “Dear authors, I think
you should consider withdrawing this paper,” with
long explanations of why I thought it would be an
embarrassment to them if the paper were published.
Fabri knows that I can be brutally frank about such
suggestions.
Fan: Did they comply?
Don: Yes, all but one. This one author fought, and
I kept saying, “You have to fix this up.” Eventually,
the changes made the paper OK. For the other ones,
the authors agreed with my criticisms: Just because
the previous editor didn’t get a good reviewer or
they overlooked mistakes, does not mean the paper
should appear. But I was not very popular, at least
at first.
Fabri: You have done a wide range of consulting.
What is the role that consulting plays in your re-
search?
Don: To me consulting is always a stimulating
source of problems. As I mentioned before, for exam-
ple, propensity score technology partly came from
the consulting work we did for June Reinisch.
Fabri:One of the more controversial cases in which
you are involved as a consultant is the US tobacco
litigation case, in which you represented the tobacco
companies as an expert witness. Would you mind
sharing some of your thoughts on this case?
Don: Happy to. This comes from my family back-
ground dealing with lawyers. We have a legal system
where certain things are legal, certain things are not.
You should generally obey laws even if you don’t like
them, or you should try to change them. If a com-
pany is making a legal product, and they are ad-
vertising it legally under current laws, then accept
it or work to change the laws. If they lie, punish
them for lying, if that is legal to do. You never see a
commercial for sporty cars that show the cars going
around corners extremely slowly and safely. How do
they advertise cars? They usually show them sweep-
ing around corners, and say “Don’t do this on your
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Fig. 8. Celebrating Don’s 70th birthday at the Yenching Restaurant, Harvard Square, March 29, 2014. Front (left to right):
Alan Zaslavsky, Elizabeth Stuart, Xiao-Li Meng, TE Raghunathan; Back (left to right): Fan Li, Elizabeth Zell, Fabrizia Mealli,
Don Rubin. The restaurant has a dish named in Don’s honor, the “Rubin.”
own.” Things that are enjoyable typically have un-
certainties or risks associated with them. Flying to
Europe to visit Fabri has risks!
Certainly I do not doubt that no matter how I
would intervene to reduce cigarette smoking, lung
cancer rates would drop. But what intervention that
would reduce smoking would involve reducing ille-
gal conduct of the cigarette industry—that is the
essence of the legal question.
When I was first contacted by a tobacco lawyer,
I was very reluctant to consult for them, and I feared
strong pressure to be dishonest, which was absent
throughout. The original topic was simply to com-
ment on the ways the plaintiffs’ experts were han-
dling missing data. On examination, their methods
seemed to me to be not the best available and, at
worst, silly (e.g., when missing “marital status,” call
them “married”). As I continued to read these ini-
tial reports, I was appalled that hundreds of billions
of dollars could be sought on the basis of such anal-
yses. From a broader perspective, the logic underly-
ing most of the analyses also seemed to me entirely
confused. For example, alleged misconduct seemed
to play no role in nearly all calculations, and phrases
such as “caused by” or “attributable to,” were used
nearly interchangeably and often apparently with-
out thought. Should nearly a trillion dollars in dam-
ages be awarded on the basis of faulty logic and bad
statistical analyses because we “know” the defen-
dant is evil and guilty? If the issue were assessing the
tobacco industry a trillion dollar fine for lying about
its products, I would be amazed but mute. But these
reports were using statistical arguments to set the
numbers—is it acceptable to use bad statistics to set
numbers because we “know” the defendant is guilty?
What sort of precedent does that imply? The ethics
of this consulting is discussed at some length in Ru-
bin (2002).
Fabri: We have talked quite a lot about statistics.
Let’s talk about some of your other passions in life,
for example, music, audio systems and sports cars.
Don: There are other passions, too, and their order
is very age dependent (I leave more to your percep-
tions). When a kid, for example, sports cars, both
driving them and rebuilding them, was the top of
those three hobbies. But age (poorer vision, slower
reflexes, more aches and pains, etc.) shifted the bal-
ance more to music, both live and recorded—luckily
my ears are still good enough to enjoy these, but as
more age catches up, things may shift.
Fan and Fabri:Well, it has been nearly three hours
since we started the conversation. Here is the final
question before letting you go for dinner: What is
your short advice to young researchers in statistics?
Don: Have fun! Don’t be grumpy. If lucky, you
may live to have a wonderful 70th birthday celebra-
tion!2
2Video of the celebration is available at: http://www.stat.
harvard.edu/DonRubin70/
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